This project is a research-driven design framework informed by game theory, cryptography, and long-horizon mathematical constraints.

It explores whether decentralized financial coordination can be structured without centralized intermediaries, using Bitcoin as a time-anchoring and verification substrate, and optional social signaling mechanisms such as Nostr.

The framework does not assume altruism, alignment, or stability. It assumes repeated interaction, voluntary participation, and the persistence of consequences over time.

Rather than optimizing outcomes, the system constrains actions through cryptographic commitments, making cooperation observable and defection durable.

No claims are made about community formation, financial independence, or improved human behavior.

The project investigates whether long-term commitments, explicit limits, and exit-preserving architectures can support forms of coordination that outlast individual participants.

This work is exploratory. Its success is not defined in advance. Failure, misuse, and irrelevance are accepted outcomes.

The framework is built on mathematics, bounded by ethics, and designed to remain inspectable across generational time horizons.